The blogger who I know as the Vineyard of the Saker (“Saker”) has written three posts on the subject of the Lavrov Kerry agreement of 14th September 2013, which has resolved the immediate Syrian crisis. Though I have great respect for this blogger whose views on the Syrian crisis have been very close to my own, I think he has misjudged the nature of the agreement that Lavrov and Kerry have reached. I wish to show that his fears concerning the agreement are baseless.
My intention was to post my response on his blog but unfortunately the length of my response makes that impossible. What I propose to do therefore is write my response here and post a link to his blog.
Here are his three posts on the subject of the Lavrov Kerry agreement I take issue with:
The second of these posts sets out the text of the agreement itself with the parts of the agreement Saker is concerned with highlighted.
Before discussing the agreement there are two important points to make:
1. Saker is absolutely right to doubt the good faith of those in the US administration whose objective from the start of this crisis has been regime change. The regime change agenda has not gone away. On the contrary its recent defeat is widely (and wrongly) seen as a humiliation of the United States by much of the US political class. Unfortunately that all but guarantees that they will now work overtime to try to reverse it. There is no room for complacency. A battle has been won but the war is far from over. We have fierce battles ahead.
2. It is essential to understand Russia’s position, which has been consistent throughout this crisis. This is to defend international law and the primacy of the Security Council and of the United Nations in securing world peace and to resist the extremely dangerous doctrine that has been gaining ground in the United States, Britain and to a lesser extent in France, which says that the governments of those countries have the right to intervene unilaterally to overthrow governments of which they disapprove and which they say misbehave. I discussed this all in detail in the following article I wrote for my own blog.
Putin’s own comments discussed this further in his now famous article in the New York Times.
Lastly I would also refer to certain of comments discussing this very issue in a recent Crosstalk debate in which I appeared on RT TV, which as always was expertly handled by Peter Lavelle.
Turning now to yesterday’s agreement, Sergei Lavrov who negotiated the agreement is if he is nothing else an exceptionally experienced and professional diplomat. He is not the sort of person to make unforced errors especially when he is negotiating from a position of advantage. That in itself and Syria’s support for the agreement announced today (Syria has hailed the agreement as a “victory”) is in itself a good reason tor think that the terms of the agreement are in Russia’s and Syria’s interests.
Turning to the agreement I will now address the specific points in it that concern Saker:
1. Saker is worried that the agreement requires Syria to grant the inspectors “unfettered access”. He presumably fears that this will set the stage for provocations such as took place with the inspection team sent to Iraq in the 1990s and which were subsequently used as grounds to claim that the Iraqi government was not cooperating with the inspection team.
The part of the agreement that refers to “unfettered access” is an unavoidable part of an agreement of this sort. The inspectors have to have unfettered access if they are to do their work properly. If Russia were to seek to deny the inspectors unfettered access the US would quite rightly say that Russia was not negotiating in good faith. At that point the US would on past experience have simply walked away from the whole negotiation. Obama would in that case have been in a much stronger position to argue for a military strike than he was before the negotiation took place since he would have been in a position to say quite rightly that Russia’s stance had exposed the whole negotiation as a sham.
Saker’s concern about “unfettered access” is really a concern about the impartiality of the inspectors. That is a fully legitimate concern of which more below.
2. Saker is worried that the agreement will be set out in a Security Council Resolution. He has previously and correctly argued that since Syria is joining the Chemical Weapons Convention such a Resolution is not legally needed.
In fact the decision to proceed by way of a Security Council Resolution reflects the Russian position not the US position in this crisis. It is Russia which throughout this crisis has insisted that it is the Security Council and the Security Council alone which is authorised to decide whether military action should or should not be taken against Syria. It is Russia which has insisted that it is the Security Council alone that is entitled to judge whether or not Syria is in breach of its treaty obligations. It is the United States, which by contrast has insisted and which continues to insist on its unfettered right to act unilaterally without reference to the Security Council in any circumstance where it judges it appropriate.
By ensuring that the agreement is set out in a Resolution of the Security Council Russia has ensured that the agreement becomes the property of the Security Council and is subject to the supervision of the Security Council. That means that if there are any breaches of the agreement they must be referred to the Security Council, which Russia says can alone decide what to do. By contrast if there was no reference in the agreement to the Security Council and no Resolution by the Security Council setting out the agreement then this would simply be an agreement between Russia and the United States. The United States would in that case in conformity with its unilateralist doctrine consider itself free to decide without reference to the Security Council whether the agreement had been violated or not. Knowing what we do about the eagerness of some people in the United States to launch an attack on Syria it is a foregone conclusion in that case that at some point in the future someone in the United States would argue that the agreement had been violated and would press for an attack without any reference being made to the Security Council. Were that to happen it is more likely than not that an attack would take place.
3. Saker is concerned that the agreement says that in the event of breaches of the agreement the Security Council might take action under Chapter VII.
After the Libyan experience I understand Saker’s concerns about Security Council Resolutions that mention Chapter VII. However, the text of the agreement shows that it has been carefully drafted with precisely such concerns in mind.
The reference to possible measures by the Security Council under Chapter VII follows directly from Putin’s comments in his interview with the Associated Press that I discussed in my previous post.
Putin said in that interview that Russia might in appropriate circumstances agree that the Security Council might authorise military action against Syria under Chapter VII. As I explained in my previous post those comments were misinterpreted as an indication that Putin’s opposition to military action against Syria was softening. In reality what Putin was doing was avoiding the trap Jacques Chirac fell into in the run up to the attack on Iraq in 2003. As I have previously said, on the eve of that attack Chirac made certain comments that were misrepresented by the US and British governments as indicating that France would veto Security Council authorisation of military action against Iraq in any circumstances whatsoever. The US and British governments on that basis were able to claim that there was no point in discussing the matter further in the Security Council because Chirac’s “intransigence” had already ruled the option of military action out supposedly making any further discussion pointless.
Having insisted on the sole authority of the Security Council to decide what happens in the event that the terms of the agreement are violated Russia cannot afford to appear to foreclose the Security Council’s options in advance by denying the possibility of action under Chapter VII. Were it to do so the United States would again say that there was no point in leaving the decision to the Security Council since Russian “intransigence” had made that pointless. The agreement has to refer to possible action under Chapter VII if it is to stick.
What Russia has however managed to do is to take out of the agreement any reference to military action or sanctions (as opposed to “measures”) under Chapter VII. Russia has made it clear both in the body of the agreement and in the comments Lavrov made in his press conference yesterday that Russia expects (and is in a position to insist) that any action under Chapter VII does not initially take the form of military action or sanctions.
This is an important victory for Russian diplomacy. It means that in the event of violations Russia can point to the agreement when it insists on a graduated response allowing time for diplomacy to work.
4. Having set out in the agreement what would happen in the event that there are violations of its terms the Russians have also managed to keep open the question of who might be responsible for such violations. This is what has resulted in the paragraph that most worries Saker. The exact wording of the paragraph is as follows.
“….in the event of non compliance, including unauthorised transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone, the Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter”.
(Highlights and Italics added)
The US and its allies have been insisting throughout the crisis that the only party that has used chemical weapons in Syria is the Syrian government. Russia has strongly disputed this claim. The wording of the paragraph and the agreement as a whole reflects Russia’s position. Nowhere in the agreement does the agreement identify the Syrian government as the perpetrator of any chemical attacks. The wording of the paragraph is intended to leave open the possibility that chemical attacks, both those that have already happened and any which might happen in the future, might be the work of the rebels and not of the Syrian government.
Having achieved this and in order to ensure balance (something which was previously completely lacking in all the draft Resolutions the US and its allies have presented to the Security Council throughout the Syrian crisis and which was also lacking in Resolutions 1970 and 1973 which were passed during the Libyan crisis) the agreement makes clear that in the event of violations of the agreement by any party the Security Council will take action. I should say at this point that it is clear from the wording of the paragraph and from the agreement as a whole that it is the Security Council and not any other party acting unilaterally, which will decide what sort of action to take. I say this because much of Saker’s objection to this paragraph appears to come from a groundless fear of the contrary and a belief, that is not supported by anything in this paragraph, that it makes possible unilateral action without the authority of the Security Council.
This part of the agreement is of course a natural result of Russia’s insistence that the agreement should leave open the question of who in Syria is responsible for any chemical attacks that have occurred or that will occur. Having vested the Security Council with the power to act in the event of any violations of the agreement the agreement confirms that the Security Council may exercise this power against whoever violates the terms of the agreement. That means either the Syrian government or the rebels. The paragraph renders the agreement neutral and balanced something which as I said no previous Resolution proposed by the United States or its allies over the course of the Libyan and Syrian crises has done.
It will be for Russia to ensure that in the event of false flag operations the Security Council is not stampeded into authorising action on false premises in the way that it was stampeded into authorising such action against the Libyan government in 2011. With inspectors on the ground in Syria reporting to the Security Council false flag operations ought to be more difficult and easier to expose.
5. Which brings me to what is actually the heart of the agreement and the part of the agreement which I suspect took the most time to agree. This is the lengthy technical section that deals with the composition and control of the inspection team that will be sent to Syria to enforce the agreement.
What went catastrophically wrong in Iraq in the 1990s is that an enfeebled Russia ceded control of the inspection team in Iraq to the US government. The result was that Richard Butler the head of the inspection team was reporting and taking instructions from the US State Department instead of the UN Secretariat. I can remember him actually doing this in 1998 on the eve of Operation Desert Fox when he actually met with US officials before he met with anyone from the UN Secretariat.
If the same thing happens in Syria then the agreement is in serious trouble for all its other safeguards. Precisely so that does not happen the agreement goes into great detail about the composition, responsibility and accountability of the inspection team making it clear that it is a joint enterprise of the United States and Russia.
In other words Russia is going to be actively involved in the work of the inspection team. Indeed I suspect that a significant proportion of the inspectors will be Russian. Russia will have a say on how the inspectors carry out their work and through its position as a permanent member of the Security Council (the body the agreement says has the final authority) will jointly receive their reports and will be party to any decisions taken about how to respond to them.
Overall in my opinion this is the best possible agreement that could have been obtained in the circumstances and represents a triumph for Russian diplomacy and a victory for international law. Assad for his part has been forced to give up his chemical arsenal and to allow inspectors into the country. Saker has himself explained why possession of chemical weapons is not in Syria’s interests whilst I would argue that having impartial inspectors in the country able to report on what is actually happening there as opposed to relying on what are often mendacious reports from the Syrian rebels is strongly in the Syrian government’s interests. It is worth at this point pointing out that on the two previous occasions when inspectors/observers were in the country over the course of this crisis – as a result of the Arab League peace plan and following Kofi Annan’s peace plan – it was the Syria government’s enemies who on both occasions successfully insisted that they should be pulled out.
I would add in passing that one further important gain for Assad from this agreement is that the agreement implicitly recognises the government he heads as the legitimate government of Syria. I say this because at various times various persons including various western officials as well as officials of the Arab League have cast doubt on his legitimacy.
The US is now party to an agreement that requires it to accept the authority of the Security Council and which contains safeguards so that the inspection team created by agreement is not manipulated. That does not mean that the Syrian crisis is over or that an attack on Syria will not take place. Despite all the safeguards there may still be attempts to manipulate the inspection team as happened with the one in Iraq. It will be for Russia and its ally China to make sure that doesn’t happen.
The US for its part must know by now that it stands little chance of bullying Russia (and by extension the Security Council) into authorising an unwarranted military attack on Syria. However it continues to make clear that it still considers itself entitled to act unilaterally. It is for persons like Saker and others who think like him to mobilise politically to ensure that public opposition to an attack that takes place without authorisation from the Security Council is so strong that it doesn’t happen. The way to do that is through the sort of work Saker is doing on his blog. By binding the US to act within international law and by upholding the authority of the United Nations and of the Security Council this agreement has made that task easier.
17th August 2013
Here is Saker’s response to my comment with much of which I agree.
Here is my response.
There is so much in what you say that I completely agree with. The difference between us is actually very small. You are quite right in questioning the total bad faith of some people within the US government. You are also absolutely right in saying that they will try to spin any agreement to mean what they say even if doing so goes against the plain meaning of the words. Indeed they are trying to do that very thing now as they claim that the agreement requires a Chapter VII Resolution when of course it does no such thing. They are also busy spinning yesterday’s report of the UN inspectors to say that it “conclusively proves” that the Assad regime carried out the gas attack on 21st August 2013 when the report itself is careful to do no such thing. Here by the way is the report.
I would by the way add that there is nothing new in this. If you go back to the 1988 Geneva Accords agreed prior to the Soviet pull out from Afghanistan you will find that the US again did the same thing.
The Russians for their part can have absolutely no illusions about this. Remember they have had more history of trying to negotiate with the US than anyone else.
However the point always to remember is that the US is in a position to attack Syria at any time. The question is whether this agreement makes such an attack easier or more difficult to justify given that the only real constraint on the US is US public opinion, The short answer in my opinion is that it unequivocally makes it much more difficult.
The US public has shown that it does not want to become involved in a war in Syria. Setting up a process for Syria’s chemical disarmament removes the one pretext for such a war that the hardliners had latched onto. Putting in place in Syria an inspection team that will be partly under Russian control and which will include Russian personnel makes it more difficult for this process to be manipulated and easier to ensure that this process is carried out properly.
Having said that there is absolutely no room for complacency. We are going to have a battle over the next few days over the text of the Security Council Resolution. There will be a struggle over the composition and control of the inspection team itself and of its work. More weapons will be sent to the rebels and attempts will be made to make conditions for the team more difficult to justify pulling it out.
The battle will be fought diplomatically (by Russia and China) and politically by people like us. This is far from over yet.
By the way don’t underestimate yourself or the importance of what you do.